Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for Track III Diplomacy as the Best Approach for Successful Negotiation of This Ethnic Conflict by Turk, A. Marco
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-2006
Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time
Is Right for Track III Diplomacy as the Best
Approach for Successful Negotiation of This Ethnic
Conflict
A. Marco Turk
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
A. Marco Turk, Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for Track III Diplomacy as the Best Approach for Successful
Negotiation of This Ethnic Conflict, 28 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 205 (2006).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol28/iss2/1
Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue:
The Time is Right for Track III
Diplomacy as the Best Approach for
Successful Negotiation of
this Ethnic Conflict
A. MARCO TURK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The cost of conflict around the world in human life, property,
and social institutions makes it more apparent with each passing
day that the struggle for world peace must be reconfigured.
Democracy seems to be ignored in the elite practice of diplomacy
that refuses to consider the needs of abused people, their hatred
over human rights abuses, ethnic divisions, and exclusion from
democratic processes in the determination of their own destinies.
As a Fulbright Senior Scholar in conflict resolution, my
experiences on the eastern Mediterranean island of Cyprus, and
* J.D. cum laude (Southwestern University School of Law), B.A. (University of
Washington). Professor and Director, Graduate Program in Negotiation, Conflict
Resolution, and Peacebuilding, California State University, Dominguez Hills. Since my
1997 Fulbright Senior Scholar award in conflict resolution, my international peacebuilding
efforts have been centered on Cyprus. Portions of this article originally appeared under a
different title in THE CRIMINOLOGIST, May 2004. I am grateful to Shawn Tafreshi,
immediate past Editor-in-Chief of this law review and formerly my UC Irvine
undergraduate student, who graciously solicited this article and provided the structural
suggestions that I have utilized.
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the failure of the United Nations (UN) efforts to achieve
reunification of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
communities in conflict, support the need for such a
reconfiguration.
In 1960 the island of Cyprus achieved its independence from
England.' By 1963 the Greek Cypriot majority was engaged in the
ethnic cleansing of the Turkish Cypriot minority. This changed in
1974 when 35,000 Turkish troops arrived on the northern part of
the island.2 The troops' presence eventually resulted in the
partition and creation of the breakaway "Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus," recognized by no country in the world other
than Turkey. Depending on the particular point of view, Turkey
either invaded the island to occupy the northern part, or was
forced by international inaction to send troops to protect the
Turkish Cypriot minority from potential abuse by the Greek
Cypriot majority.' Notwithstanding UN efforts since 1974 to
reestablish a central government and obtain the agreement of both
communities to live together peacefully on the island, the conflict
remains intractable and ripe for Track III' (grass roots)
intervention to achieve a reconfiguration.
As background to the current problem, Part II of this Article
summarizes the historical ethnic underpinnings of the Cyprus
conflict. Part III explores how the ethnic-political dynamic shaped
my conflict resolution approach to the Cyprus problem. Part IV
presents positive examples of civil society Track III effectiveness
achieved by my methods. Part V discusses how the Track III
approach can be applied to situations with analogous conflict. Part
VI concludes with recommendations regarding any future efforts
at reunification of Cyprus using Track III diplomacy, considering
possible outcomes in the event of failure.
II. HISTORICAL ETHNIC UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CYPRUS
CONFLICT
According to Joseph S. Joseph, the Cyprus problem is a
domestic conflict because it involves parties within a single state
identifiable by characteristics (e.g., geographic region, ideology,
1. See DAVID HANNAY, CYPRUS: THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION 1 (I.B. Tauris &
Co. Ltd. 2005) (original date of publication).
2. See id. at 6-7.
3. See id. at 5-7.
4. See Part V infra for a detailed definition.
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language, religion, or ethnicity).' He notes that ethnicity implies a
sharing of the "same sense of ancestral identification," and that
more than one ethnic group can be different from while
comprising the population of a single state.6 Joseph defines
domestic ethnic conflict as the following:
[T]he situation where two or more segments of a population,
constituent elements of the same state, but with different ethnic
identifications, are pursuing incompatible or mutually exclusive
political goals.
7
He designates the Cyprus problem for study as a "domestic
ethnic conflict in an international context" that "affects and is
affected by the international environment."' Joseph believes that
there will be a "more fruitful" effort if we do so "within an
international context and against the background of
interdependence, power politics, conflict, and cooperation which
characterize the world of nations."9
A. History of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus
Cyprus as an island-state suffers from prolonged ethnic
conflicts involving its two major communities, Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot." Inter-ethnic communal relations are derived
from socio-cultural difference, while external forces have become
an exacerbating factor in the conflict.'1 The creation of ancient
roots has expanded throughout the history of the ethnic conflict in
Cyprus.
During the Ottoman period, major factors in the conflict were
religious and cultural, such as the "process of Islamization,"
interests in securing strong ties with Turkey, and later strong
efforts by Greek nationals seeking unification with mainland
Greece ("enosis").' 2 From the arrival of the Middle Ages to the 19
5. See JOSEPH S. JOSEPH, CYPRUS: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE THRESHOLD OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 4 (2d ed. 1997).
6. See id. at 4-5.
7. Id. at 6.
8. See id. at 12.
9. Id.
10. S.S. Misra, Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus: A Socio-Political Study, in CYPRUS: IN
SEARCH OF PEACE AND JUSTICE 198 (R.C. Sharma & Stavros A. Epaminondas eds.,
1997).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Century, there was peaceful ethnic co-existence through
interspersion of Greek and Turkish settlements throughout the
island, occasionally marked by Greek Cypriot rebellions.
Notwithstanding ethnic and religious differences, grassroots
peaceful coexistence existed in the face of oppression from the
13
top. 3
Economic coercion was applied by the Ottomans to
accomplish religious conversion of Greek Cypriots. 4 This was the
beginning of Greek Cypriot distrust of Turkish Cypriots because
the latter, although a minority, were in control economically and
politically." In 1878, Ottoman rulers in Turkey ceded Cyprus to
Great Britain, notwithstanding that the 80% Greek Cypriot
population preferred Greece with which they had closer ethnic,
religious, cultural, and political ties. 6 Subsequent British colonial
rule only served to increase the communal conflict resulting from
the ethnic differentiation under Ottoman rule.
Notwithstanding grassroots peaceful coexistence, the religious
differences (between Orthodox Christians and Muslims) kept the
two communities apart and preserved their individual identities.18
Greek Cypriot nationalism developed under the Orthodox
Church's political leadership, which increased through extension
of the education system." As early as 1931, Greek Cypriots were
mobilized to demand enosis. ° Much later, the nationalist leanings
of Turkish Cypriots countered the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial
nationalist movement. This led to Turkish Cypriot support of
British rule on the island.2' From this came Ottoman influenced
calls from Turkish Cypriots for their separate identity and claims.22
The result was an ethnic conflict between the two communities
that was conditioned by two separate claims of nationalism
traceable to two separate outside influences, Greek as well as
Turkish.23
13. Id.
14. Id. at 199.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 200.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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During the British rule, appeasement toward the Turkish
Cypriot minority worsened the inter-ethnic relations and
politicization of the traditional power structure. Turkish Cypriots
sided with the British while the Greek Cypriots were engaged in
uprising against the British, resulting in a further widening of the
rift between the two communities.2 ' As early as 1945, because of
intensification of the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement for
enosis, Turkish Cypriots sought separatism and unification with
Turkey, and demanded partition of the island ("taksim"). Both
Turkey and Britain supported this. 5
Both Greece and Turkey have had major impacts on
intensification of the ethnic conflict that became internationalized
with time. 6 In order to counter the Greek Cypriot nationalist
demand for enosis, the British enlisted Turkish Cypriots as
auxiliary police to deal with Greek nationalists on the island. 7 This
resulted in ethnic clashes that caused rioting and the deaths of
innocent civilians.2 ' Although Turkey initiated the ethnic riots, the
British ignored these in order to force compromise from Greek
Cypriots.29
In the aftermath of the British withdrawal from the majority
of the island and the granting of Cypriot independence in 1960, an
equal sharing of power between the two communities did not
occur." The Greek Cypriot majority sought enosis with Greece
while the Turkish Cypriot minority wanted partition of the island
between Greece and Turkey, if complete annexation by Turkey
under some international arrangement was not possible." The
result brought the international attention to the ethnic conflict
because of the "geo-strategic implications of the Cyprus problem,"
and any decision regarding partition was opposed.2 On the eve of
the island's 1960 independence from Britain, the ethnic conflict
continued to separate the two communities.3
The result of such competition between the two major ethnic
24. Id.
25. Id. at 200-01.
26. See id. at 201.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 202-03.
31. Id. at 201.
32. Id. at 201-02.
33. Id. at 202.
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groups in Cyprus was "one of intergenerational crisis of the
Cypriot society" because ethnic differences were aroused on a
geographical basis opening the island to serious divisions and
contests.' So from the inception of independence in 1960, the two
communities failed to collaborate in an effort to achieve a united
and integrated Cyprus." The resulting bicommunal," bizonal37
constitutional framework of the newly independent Republic of
Cyprus exacerbated the ethnic division." The Greek Cypriots felt
they had not received their share of economic and political power
as befitted their proportional position on the island. 9 The Turkish
Cypriots exhibited an uncompromising attitude in light of their
lesser share of the percentage received, provoking Greek
nationalists to reject the constitution. '
The ethnic clashes during Christmas 1963 gave Turkey an
excuse to threaten invasion of the island to secure Turkish Cypriot
interests.4' This was followed by large population shifts, resulting in
ethnic groups gravitating to their respective territorial enclaves
and "de facto partition of the island." 2 This ethnic crisis set the
stage for both communities to invite UN mediation and the
stationing of its peacemaking troops (United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus customarily referred to as
"UNFICYP") on the island to establish the security and safety
necessary for resolution of the ethnic conflict."3 The democratic
elections of 1968 and 1970, respectively, helped to calm the
situation and downplay the ethnic division resulting in "inter-
ethnic cooperation at the political level.""
But the cooperation did not last. The 1967 mainland coup in
Greece revived the Greek Cypriots' interest in enosis." The new
military regime in Greece plotted the 1974 coup in Cyprus to
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Throughout this article, bicommunal will be spelled without a hyphen (rather than
bi-communal).
37. Throughout this article, bizonal will be spelled without a hyphen (rather than bi-
zonal).
38. See Misra, supra note 10, at 202.
39. See id. at 203.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 203-04.
44. See id. at 204.
45. Id. at 204.
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overturn President (Archbishop) Makarios," who fled the country
even though the coup failed. 7 Turkey sent troops to attack the
island and attempted to justify this by defending its action as a
"peace operation" to restore order on the island." Makarios
eventually returned and resumed power. Political order was re-
established but the Turkish troops continued to occupy the
northern part of the island. 9 Thousands of Greek Cypriots were
killed and wounded." Approximately 40 percent of the Greek
Cypriot population was forced to flee their homes in the areas
occupied by Turkey, becoming refugees on their own island. 1
(Greek Cypriots from the north fled to the south, and Turkish
Cypriots from the south fled to the north.)
Turkey has continued to occupy approximately 37 percent of
the island (with between 35,000-40,000 of its troops) ignoring
repeated UN attempts to require withdrawal of all foreign troops
from Cyprus in an effort to guarantee the island's sovereignty and
territorial integrity.52 The most recent attempts to resolve the
Cyprus problem were the five versions of the plan proposed by
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Annan I, II, III, IV, and V)
between October 2002 and March 2004 that were rejected, thus
53failing to accomplish their purpose.
B. Key Points in the Five Versions of the Annan Plan
1. Annan I
A new common state of Cyprus was created with its own
constitution (each component state could draft its own so long as it
46. Makarios was both the leader of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus and the
chief executive of the Republic.
47. See Misra, supra note 10, at 204.
48. Id. at 204-05.
49. Id. at 205.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 205. See also CLAIRE PALLEY, AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
DEBACLE: THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN CYPRUS
1999-2004 15 (Hart Publishing UK 2005).
53. See id. at 275, Appendix 6. See also HANNAY, supra note 1, at 192, 194-95. On
December 13, 2002, the EU, although still hoping for a reunited island by the time the
Accession Treaty would be signed, relaxed its requirements for Cyprus and accepted the
candidacy for accession of a divided island. (The stick had been removed leaving only the
carrot.)
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would not be incompatible with the overall settlement). 54
Numerous annexes dealt with, among other things, security,
property, territorial adjustment, and European Union (EU)
issues." If both community-approval referendum vote results were
positive, the set of agreements would become effective the
following day, so that the EU could take appropriate action to
admit to membership the new unified Cyprus.6
With respect to status, sovereignty, and continuity, there
would be a "new state of affairs in Cyprus" referred to as
"Cyprus" or the "State of Cyprus."57 The result would be a "single
international legal personality" consisting of two separate states.
The "common state" would exercise the constitutional powers
allocated to it while the component states would exercise all other
powers. There would be no hierarchy between the two levels. 9 All
prior acts of the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus and the
Turkish Cypriot TRNC would be legitimized so long as they did
not contradict the settlement terms.' The new "state of affairs"
(not "state") would be "indissoluble" so that neither secession nor
domination of any other institution by one side would be possible.61
Foreign affairs, EU relations, central-bank functions,
common-state finances (to the extent relevant), economic and
trade policy, aviation and navigation policy, as well as some more
technical matters, were allocated to the common state.62 The Swiss
model for an executive council of the common state was followed
(four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots chosen be each
side, respectively) requiring agreement by at least one member
from each side." The council would select a president and vice-
president from among its members, rotating every six months with
never less than a 2:1 rotation." However, for the first 36 months of
the new state of affairs the two leaders (Glafcos Clerides for the
Greek Cypriots and Rauf Denktash for the Turkish Cypriots)
54. See HANNAY, supra note 1, at 182.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 182-83.
58. Id. at 183.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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would serve as "co-presidents."6 5
Two houses of parliament would be established for the
common state: The upper house would be divided 50:50 between
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots elected by the legislatures of
their respective component states.' The lower house would be
elected by popular vote, and the share of seats could not be less
than 25 percent for either side." No legislation could be passed
without approval of both houses, and Turkish Cypriots were
protected from subornation of any of their members during any
effort to pass anti-Turkish Cypriot legislation.' To avoid the
possibility of a deadlock, and to permit it to break ties in the event
other institutions deadlocked, a supreme court would be
comprised of three Greek Cypriots, three Turkish Cypriots, and
three non-Cypriots. 9
Regarding security, neither of the two separate states could
secede nor unite with any outside state." The number of Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot troops that could remain on the
island was limited (somewhere between 1,000 and 9,999).71
Disbanding of all Cypriot forces with removal of arms, a legally
binding arms embargo, and island-wide UN-mandated
international military presence for an indefinite period, were
prescribed.
Territorial adjustment providing for transfer of additional
property to Greek Cypriots, enabling the return of more Greek
Cypriots and displacement of fewer Turkish Cypriots, was
specified. 2 A "property board" was to be established to handle
mutual compensation for lost property and determination of "right
of residence."" A moratorium on return was to exist for three
years regarding unoccupied property and five years for occupied
property.7" While no decision was made regarding Turkish Cypriot
citizenship for post-1974 Turkish immigrants, all Cypriots would
be Cypriot citizens as well as citizens of their respective
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 183-84.
70. Id. at 184.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 185.
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component states.75
Settlement of the Cyprus problem and EU membership were
inseparable.7 ' Rights of establishment and purchase of property
were restricted. Cyprus's military participation in EU Security and
Defense Policy was ruled out.77 EU financial assistance would be
sought to narrow the economic gap between Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots.7 ' And a reconciliation commission was proposed
to facilitate healing of wounds and to deal with "antagonistic
interpretations of historical events."
2. Annan II
The main changes to Annan I were in the areas of political
citizenship, the transitional presidency, and the residual presence
of Greek and Turkish troops.' Political citizenship could be held in
only one component state or the other, not both; and a four-year
moratorium would be imposed on Greek Cypriots moving to the
north and Turkish Cypriots moving to the south, with caps
established regarding such change in residencies.8 The definition
of Cypriot citizenship was revised so that, in effect, most Turkish
immigrants (even post-1974) would become citizens of the Turkish
Cypriot component state, and provision was made for EU financial
assistance to those who were refused permanent residency and
were repatriated.' Further territorial map adjustments were made,
and a cap was placed on property restitution.83 A "relocation
board" was proposed to help displaced persons resulting from
territorial adjustments, including direct UN involvement. '
The transitional presidency of the two signatory co-presidents
of the component state (Clerides and Denktash) was reduced from
three years to 30 months.' There could be no amendment of the
basic articles of the new constitution, and the European
Parliament seats allocated to Cyprus would be divided two-thirds
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 189-91.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 190.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 189.
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Greek Cypriot and one-third Turkish Cypriot.' Management of
natural resources would become a common rather than
component state responsibility, and EU safeguard measures to
protect the Turkish Cypriot component state were increased."
The residual presence of Greek and Turkish troops was
specified to be 2,500-7,500, and it was left to Greece and Turkey to
negotiate the actual figure.' The two component states, as well as
Greece and Turkey, would need to consent to any international
military operation in the "new" Cyprus, and the required notice to
the UN concerning troop movements of the residual contingent
forces remaining on the island was raised.'
3. Annan III
The decision was made to submit the proposed settlement
plan for approval at separate simultaneous referenda in each
community, effectively taking the two leaders "off the hook" so
their only obligation would be to put the proposal to their
respective voters.' If both electorates approved the proposal, the
two leaders would be bound (along with Greece, Turkey, and
Britain, the three guarantor powers) to put the voter-approved
plan into operation the next day.9 However, it was made clear that
a negative vote on the referenda would not invalidate EU
accession.'
Cyprus would be renamed "The United Cyprus Republic," an
"independent and sovereign state with a single international legal
personality and a federal government" consisting of "two
constituent states, namely the Greek Cypriot State and the
Turkish Cypriot State."93 Annan III increased Turkish Cypriot land
to 29.2 percent. The two constituent states would each gain the
right to determine their own internal citizenship.95 Annan III
increased the moratorium on the Greek Cypriot right of residence
in the north to six years and adjusted the length of the various
86. See id. at 190.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 189-90.
90. See id. at 208.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 211.
93. See id. at 208.
94. Id. at 209.
95. Id.
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periods following expiration of the moratorium.96
At such time as Turkey would accede to EU membership, all
remaining Greek and Turkish troops would be removed from
Cyprus. In the meantime, it would no longer be required that
Greece and Turkey agree to international military operations on
the island." Restriction was imposed on the definition of the term
"religious sites" so as to prevent the Greek Cypriot Orthodox
Church from excessive repossession of property in the north." A
specific list of 45,000 Turkish immigrants who would have the right
to Turkish Cypriot citizenship was advanced. Exemption of
students and academic staff from residency limitations and
immigration controls was provided."
Most favored nation status was included for Turkey.'" Debts
were to be assumed by the respective constituent states.' 1 Six
thousand Turkish and Greek troops were permitted to remain on
the island. However, the advance notice required for ordinary
troop movements would be reduced to two days, and to three days
for troop exercises."
The EU and the Council of Europe would endorse the
settlement so as to avoid property litigation. The new federal
government would harmonize the economies of the two
constituent states."3 The EU would be requested to convene a
"donor conference" to raise funds for displacement costs resulting
from territorial and other adjustments. The increase in territorial
adjustments and overall property reinstatement limits favored
Greek Cypriots." An unlimited number of Greek Cypriots could
return to certain specified villages that would have the sole
responsibility for their own cultural and educational affairs."0
Greek Cypriots residing in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state
would have immediate voting rights in European and local
elections. 6 Greek Cypriots over the age of 65 would have only a
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 210.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. See id.
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two-year moratorium regarding their return to property in the
north, and all quantitative restrictions would be removed. Nine
years permanent residence would be a prerequisite to attaining
Cypriot citizenship.
Non-Cypriot supreme court judges would only be permitted
to have a voice if Cypriots could not agree, and a "Court of First
Instance" would be created. Rules regarding entry and residence
rights would need to be compatible with the Schengen
agreement. ' Resolution of the missing-persons issue from 1974
would be given constitutional force. Annan III also covered
removal of Greek and Turkish troops from the island, elimination
of the requirement that Greece and Turkey agree to international
military operations, and removal of limits on Greek Cypriot
residence in the north, upon Turkey's accession to the EU.
4. Annan IV and V
In early February 2004, the parties agreed to resume
negotiations "under the aegis of the UN and on the basis of the
Annan Plan," with the Greek and Turkish governments joining in
if necessary.'" If this failed, Annan would prepare and submit a
new version of his plan for voter approval (during the April 24,
2004 referendum elections)."° In the meantime, EU draft
legislation for a reunited Cyprus would be completed. " ' Because
Annan failed to obtain agreement on amendments (Annan IV) to
earlier versions of his plan, he was forced to abandon a final
definitive version of his plan (Annan V)." However, it was Annan
V (although not fundamentally different from earlier versions)
that was submitted to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
voters on April 24, 2004.12
The poll results demonstrated that rational self-interest was
necessary to overcome the "demons of history and prejudice,"
something that was not possible here given the elitist Track I
107. The 1985 agreement between France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, signed at Schengen, Luxembourg, providing for the end of controls on their
common internal borders so that a single external border for immigration checks was
established with one set of rules. Explanation available at
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133020.htm.
108. See HANNAY, supra note 1, at 241-42.
109. Id. at 242.
110. Id. at 243.
111. Id. at 243-44.
112. Id. at 244.
2006]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L Rev.
(leaders only) approach taken from the very beginning.' 3 Although
purportedly the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash had
publicly referred to the Annan Plan as "dead and off the table,"
the widespread opinion of the international community was that it
was "the most sophisticated and the most complete attempt ever
made to solve the Cyprus problem""' and that EU membership by
a reunited Cyprus was "the keystone of any settlement.""'
Apparently, the Turkish Cypriots who voted "yes" agreed, but the
Greek Cypriots voting "no" did not. After one thousand years,
Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, maintains its distinction as the only
militarily divided city in Europe."' At least for the immediate
future, it will remain so along with the entire island.
III. THE ETHNIC-POLITICAL DYNAMIC THAT SHAPED MY
CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACH To THE PROBLEM
If we are to appreciate the unique attributes of this ethnic
conflict, we must consider the historical chain of events that mixed
religion, culture and politics as a powerful dynamic in the years
when attempts at resolution took place.'" The history of the
conflict is a weight that bears heavily on those who sit at the
negotiating table.
Historically, outside powers have dominated the island and its
politics, causing both communities to tend to defer to interlopers
in determining their fate. The British have not been trusted or
liked by either side. So the decision of the British "dumping the
whole problem in the laps of the Greeks and Turks, in return for
the establishment of two Sovereign Base Areas to meet their
strategic needs in an otherwise independent Cyprus,""... indicated a
willingness to look the other way that encouraged hard line
positions on both sides of the conflict. Archbishop Makarios, as
President of the Republic of Cyprus, openly expressed an opinion
that independence was but the first "step on the road to enosis,"'' .
and neither Greece nor Turkey did much to help make the
113. Id. at 246.
114. Id. at 220.
115. Id. at 234.
116. Explanation available at http://www.cosmosnet.net/azias/cyprus/nicosia.html.
117. See HANNAY, supra note 1, at 1-2.
118. Id. at 2-3.
119. Id. at 3.
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bicommunal aspect of independence succeed.2' The United States'
interest has primarily been to strategically avoid open hostilities
between Greece and Turkey that would weaken NATO, while the
former Soviet Union provided unquestioning support to Makarios
in an effort to do just the opposite.'21
Enosis and taksim (seeing that the northern part of the island
becomes part of Turkey as a result of partition or "double
enosis")' reared their nationalistic heads periodically throughout
the history of the conflict. Three international treaties between
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom negatively affected
exercise of its sovereignty by Cyprus (the Treaty of Guaranty
prevented secession or Cypriot unification with any other state;
the Treaty of Alliance permitted a small joint military force
composed of Greek and Turkish troops on the island; and the
Treaty of Establishment granted the United Kingdom its
sovereignty over the 99 square miles comprising the two Sovereign
Base Areas)."3
The United Nations has been unable to do much to improve
the security situation on the island since 1964 when it first
deployed its initial small military force."' Had it not been for the
forceful intervention by then President Lyndon B. Johnson in
1967, Turkish troops would have arrived on the island as part of a
military intervention force. 5 Since 1963, and especially following
the Turkish intervention of 1974, with the exception of Turkey, the
UN and the rest of the international community has treated the
Greek Cypriots as the sole legitimate government of Cyprus.'26
Former Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash has continued to
argue that there could be no solution to the Cyprus problem until
that attitude was reversed (i.e., either withdrawing recognition of
the Greek Cypriots or recognizing the Turkish Cypriots on an
equal but separate basis). 7
120. Id. at 3.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 3-4.
124. See id. at 5.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. But see Turkish Cypriots Elect New President, L.A. TIMES (California), Apr.
18, 2005, at A6 (on April 17, 2005, Mehmet Ali Talat, a pro-unification candidate, became
the newly elected Turkish Cypriot leader. He immediately called for reunification and EU
membership for Turkish Cypriots.).
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In the aftermath of Turkey's hostile intervention of 1974, the
ethnic cleansing was "regularized" by a 1975 agreement
acknowledging the population exchange without legal
recognition.'" While a few Greek Cypriots remain in the north and
still fewer Turkish Cypriots remain in the south, the current
geopolitical configuration of the island was established in 1975.29
Thus there are effectively two "mono-ethnic states" that are
separated only by a buffer zone maintained by UN peacekeeping
troops.3 0
Because Greek Cypriots have never forgotten the loss of one-
third of their country (rich agricultural and commercially tourist-
friendly land), they are determined to reclaim it, and
compensation for this loss has been an unacceptable alternative in
any settlement discussions."' Greek military capability has been no
match for the superior Turkish military establishment just forty
miles away (not to mention the 35,000-40,000 Turkish troops
already occupying the northern part of the island). 32 So Turkish
Cypriots have come to believe that they can only rely on Turkey,
and are convinced that the Greek Cypriots will expel all Turkish
Cypriots from the island if given the opportunity. This means that
Greek Cypriots must now deal with their own security concerns as
well as those of the Turkish Cypriots.
Although the outsiders have been convinced of the need to
work through the UN for a settlement of the Cyprus problem, they
have religiously avoided direct involvement."3 Subsequent efforts
to achieve a settlement have established a bicommunal, bizonal
federation framework for a solution.3 In 1975, while not yet
asserting independence from the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish
Cypriot demand for a federation translated into them naming their
part of the island the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.'
3 6
Subsequent concession by Greek Cypriots concerning a future
federation acknowledged passage into history of the bicommunal
128. See HANNAY, supra note 1, at 6.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 6-7.
132. Id. at 7.
133. See id. at 7.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 8.
136. Id.
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unitary state that had been the result of independence.'37 The
future would require the existence of two units, one of which
would be that of Turkish Cypriots. Obstinate machinations on the
part of both sides in the succeeding years served to frustrate any
meaningful discussions for a successful settlement of the conflict.1"
In 1983, a unilateral declaration of independence came from
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots: henceforth the northern part of
the island would be known as the "Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC).""' The UN Security Council issued a
condemnation and called on UN members not to recognize the
TRNC. None did except Turkey.'40 The creation of the TRNC has
continued to make settlement less and less attainable.'4 ' This has
also caused far-ranging problems for the TRNC and its attempt to
participate on the international stage, widening the gap between
the economies of the two communities requiring increasing
dependence of Turkish Cypriots on subsidies from Turkey.'42
The 1990 application of the Republic of Cyprus (controlled by
Greek Cypriots) to become a member of the European Union was
accepted as valid in 1995.'" However, the Turkish Cypriots
subsequently refused the offer from the Greek Cypriots to become
members of the Cyprus EU negotiating team.1" On May 1, 2004,
the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus alone became a member of
the EU.145 The long-held hope that EU accession negotiations
would enhance the opportunity for a resolution of the Cyprus
problem became another failure in the extensive list of dead-end
attempts at settlement.
IV. POSITIVE EXAMPLES OF TRACK III EFFECTIVENESS ACHIEVED
BY MY METHODS
Diplomacy is a key factor in the peacebuilding process. It is
practiced at three levels: Tracks I, II, and 111.146 Track I involves
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 9.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 241.
146. See Foundation for Co-Existence (FCE): Promoting Coexistence Through Human
Security, http://www.fcoex.com/pages/glossary.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2005). There are
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individuals from the political and military elite. They influence the
process at the high level of official and coercive action as well as
non-coercive activities such as facilitation and negotiation.' Track
II involves unofficial or informal interaction between members of
adversarial groups who seek to influence the process through
change of public opinion, as well as utilization of organized
material and human resources in an effort to achieve resolution of
a conflict.' 8 Participants at the Track II level are NGOs,
businesses, local and religious leaders, and ordinary citizens.' 9 This
level can be effective as a connector between Tracks I and III.
Finally, Track III advocates are "community-based." They employ
various approaches to peaceful resolution such as public
education, citizen advocacy, and events like conferences and
workshops, in the attempt to "achieve reconciliation, healing,
problem solving and mediation at the grassroots level." At the
Track III level the effort is to encourage "multi-stakeholder
dialogue, reconciliation exercises and co-existence among
communities.""'5
Prior to August 1997, the civil society in Cyprus had
apparently not been exposed to mediation skills and techniques.
The general population on both sides received me with great
enthusiasm. The response from the elite was patronizing at best.
The question to be addressed was how to empower both sides to
interact with each other so as to express their respective interests
and underlying needs while at the same time encouraging each to
recognize, understand, and consider the other's point of view, in
order to achieve resolution of conflict. I introduced three models:
(1) traditional problem solving,'51  (2) transformation of
relationships,'5 2 and (3) the humanistic-transformative " ' (that seeks
varying opinions regarding the estimated number of tracks. See, e.g., LOUISE DIAMOND &
JOHN W. MCDONALD, MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY: A SYSTEMS APPROACH To PEACE
1-5 (3rd ed. 1996). However, for efficient application, writers in the field generally prefer
the use of three tracks.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See generally CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (Jossey-Bass: A Wiley Imprint 2003).
152. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND
RECOGNITION 12 (Jossey-Bass Inc. 1994). A second edition has since been published.
153. See Mark S. Umbreit, Humanistic Mediation: A Transformative Journey of Peace-
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to educate and establish reasonable expectations on the part of
both sides to a conflict).
The personal histories of murder, rape, and the missing, as
well as loss of valuable property, on both sides, were something
that none of the bicommunal participants were prepared to discuss
directly with each other face-to-face, except from the vantage of
leveling charges against the other community. It was easier to keep
the real hurt to oneself. Consequently, the training allowed
participants on each side to keep their deepest feelings buried and
permitted them bicommunally to venture only so far as they were
willing to go.
From 1997-1999, I trained segments of the island's Greek and
Turkish Cypriot divided population in methods designed to
resolve their historical conflicts. While I was acutely aware of the
religious, ethnic and political conflicts to be considered in any
effort to establish peacebuilding protocols, I was careful to tread
lightly in these areas. By the time I left the island in 1999, I had
been responsible for future establishment of a mediation center in
each community in addition to having trained a bicommunal cross-
section of students, teachers, administrators, doctors, lawyers,
judges, social workers, mental health professionals, government
employees, law enforcement and military personnel in
communication skills and the three then existing approaches to
mediation. The training took place over approximately five
hundred hours, and was delivered to more than six hundred
persons.
During the last six months of 1998, I organized and worked
with a group of fifty-two Cypriots comprising the "Oslo Group."15
making, 14 MEDIATION Q. 201-13 (1997).
154. I made return trips in 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2005 to continue my peacebuilding
work with both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. My peacebuilding efforts have also taken me
to Norway, Israel, Turkey, and England, as well as to both coasts of the United States. In
October 2003, I participated as one of only two Americans invited to attend the Oxford
University international workshop on "Getting to Yes" regarding efforts to reunify
Cyprus. As part of my continuing work with the Cyprus Fulbright Commission through
the U.S. State Depdrtment, I conducted a two-week education/training program for six
Cypriot family court judges (three Greek and three Turkish) in the Los Angeles area in
August 2004, dealing with family law in a federal system. My two earlier Fulbright/State
Department programs in the USA for Cypriots (lawyers, judges, law professors, and
police) have dealt with: (1) the administration of justice, and (2) community policing, in
the United States.
155. Lawyers, accountants, mental health professionals, government employees,
business operators, teachers, students, media, and ordinary citizens totaling 25 from each
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The name of the group originated from their meeting in Oslo,
Norway, under the auspices of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission,
between June 29 and July 5, 1998, where the twenty-six Greek
Cypriots and twenty-six Turkish Cypriots convened to participate
in a conflict intervention skills1 56  training workshop for
peacebuilding in Cyprus."7 Oslo was selected as the site for the
workshop because the political situation on Cyprus prevented
Greek and Turkish Cypriots from openly meeting together on the
island. "8
The training was conducted over a three-day period followed
by two days of group deliberations, brainstorming their ideas for a
solution to the Cyprus Problem through a bicommunal, bizonal
federation.5 9 During these deliberations the group designated over
30 possible issues to be considered, deciding on six for immediate
consideration and subsequent development.' These issues were:
(1) Bicommunal Movement; (2) Structure of Government; (3)
Security; (4) Human Rights; (5) Social Issues; and (6) Economic
Issues.'6'
The issue-selection process was followed by the election of a
bicommunal steering committee consisting of five members from
each community plus their Cyprus Fulbright Commission
representative.' 62 The meeting (Oslo I) was concluded with the
issuance of a declaration by the group concerning their views on
side, plus one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot program representative from the
Cyprus Fulbright Commission. This accounts for the description of 26 citizens from each
community.
156. Connecting and communicating skills were emphasized. Examples include body
language; codes we establish; sharing feelings and ideas; hearing, seeing, understanding;
conversational style; framing and reframing; messages and meta-messages; effect of our
words and how to adjust content so we say what we mean; improving talk to improve
relationships; vocal signals; power and solidarity; empathy; "stepping into each other's
shoes;" reading faces and expressions; feedback; roles; ideology of communication; "tricks
people play;" empowerment; willingness to listen and consider the other party's point of
view; respect; forgiveness and reconciliation. See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, THAT'S
NOT WHAT I MEANT: HOW CONVERSATIONAL STYLE MAKES OR BREAKS
RELATIONSHIPS (1987).
157. Oslo I., G/T Cypriots, July 4, 1998.
158. In December 1997, I was present on the island when Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf
Denktash ordered the "Green Line" (the buffer zone separating the two communities
guarded by UN peacekeeping troops) closed, preventing Greek Cypriots going to the
north and Turkish Cypriots going to the south.
159. Oslo I., G/T Cypriots, July 4, 1998.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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the Cyprus Problem and how they hoped to contribute to a
peaceful solution on the island.63 Upon their return to Cyprus, the
52 members of the Oslo Group were divided into six subgroups,
each containing two sections (one from each community), with
each section being chaired by a steering committee member from
the appropriate community." Each subgroup was assigned one of
the six issues designated by the group in Oslo, and each section of
that subgroup was given the assignment of preparing a draft of the
particular issue under consideration by their subgroup.65
Monthly (July-December 1998), the steering committee met
bicommunally' 6 on the island for the purpose of exchanging drafts
163. OSLO GROUP DECLARATION ON CYPRUS
"A five-day workshop took place in Oslo, Norway, between twenty-five Greek-
Cypriots and twenty-five Turkish-Cypriots in their individual capacities. They
came together at the invitation of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission and were
hosted by that organization and the PRIO International Peace Research
Institute.
The need for this meeting in Oslo resulted from the difficulties currently
faced by people not being able to meet on the island. The aim was to promote
better understanding, increased contacts, resumption of bicommunal activities,
and to provide ideas for more community involvement in relation to the Cyprus
problem.
During the meetings, communication skills were acquired and practiced
setting the stage for an exchange of views on the solution to the Cyprus problem
and the future of the bicommunal movement.
In relation to the Cyprus problem the group emphasized the importance of
working towards the establishment of a democratic, bizonal, bicommunal
Federal Republic in which human rights will be recognized and implemented,
the security needs of both communities will be safeguarded, and which will
achieve membership in the European Union as the Federal Republic of Cyprus
at the earliest possible time.
The group expressed anxiety over the current deterioration of the peace
efforts and escalation of tension on the island. It is believed that the resumption
and support by everybody of bicommunal contacts would play an important role
in creating a conducive climate for cooperation and understanding, which will
form the basis for a fair, just, and lasting peace in Cyprus.
The necessity of reconvening the Oslo group was recognized by the
participants for further discussion of the issues relating to coexistence
development activities. It is hoped that these [discussions] will promote better
understanding in Cyprus and facilitate a speedy solution to the Cyprus problem.
The group would like to express their appreciation to the Cyprus Fulbright
Commission, the PRIO International Peace Research Institute, and the
Norwegian Foreign Ministry for making this event possible."
"Oslo, Norway July 4, 1998."
164. Oslo I., GIT Cypriots, July 4, 1998.
165. It was made clear to me by several members of the group at the conclusion of the
workshop during evaluation that, had they not participated in the intensive three-day
conflict intervention skills portion, the results would not have developed as they did.
166. These meetings took place in a restaurant located outside the small village of Pyla
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with their subgroup counterparts on the assigned issues and
continued to rework the papers. Final working drafts were
exchanged, and unified resulting papers were prepared for
presentation to the overall group at their next meeting in Oslo.
Under the continuing auspices of the Cyprus Fulbright
Commission, 31 members of the Oslo Group returned to Norway,
from December 7-11, 1998, '67 to consider, discuss, amend, and
adopt final detailed statements of interest concerning each of the
six issues. '
Subsequent to completion of their working sessions, the
members of Oslo II were invited by the International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), to attend the one-hour live
taping of the CNN interview of the two 1998 Nobel Peace
Laureates, which took place at the Oslo City Hall, the site of the
actual awards. After having adopted what I believe was the first
expression at any track of concrete suggestions concerning issues
involved -in a potential Cypriot bicommunal, bizonal federation,6 9
this was a very moving concluding experience for all members of
the group who heard the two laureates speak of forgiveness and
reconciliation in Northern Ireland.
The work product of the Oslo Group was in no way intended
to be exclusive, preemptive, or the only approach to the subject
matter. This was simply the work of 31 participants at Oslo II who
drew upon the efforts of the 52 members of Oslo I, to express their
own collective personal interests based on their underlying
(in the Pergamos area on the site of the British Sovereign Base Areas) very close to a Turkish
Cypriot checkpoint permitting only limited passage (person and time) solely by Turkish
Cypriots. Some months earlier, I had discovered this limited area that is located
approximately 45 minutes southeast of the capitol city of Nicosia. The meetings were able to
take place because of the sympathetic owners of the restaurant. Subsequently, until April 21,
2003, when Denktash announced the lifting of all restrictions on the Green Line (See
HANNAY, supra note 1, at 225), an increasing number of bicommunal groups adopted that
approach and gravitated to the restaurant for meetings on a regular basis.
167. Oslo II., G/T Cypriots, December 7-11, 1998.
168. Because of attrition due to illness, employment, or preexisting personal
commitments, it was not possible for all 52 members to attend the Oslo II meeting.
169. FINAL REPORT OF THE CYPRUS FULBRIGHT COMMISSION'S OSLO II
BICOMMUNAL PEACEBUILDING WORKSHOP TO CONSIDER RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING THE FOLLOWING AS THEY CONCERN A POSSIBLE FEDERAL SOLUTION OF
THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: BICOMMUNAL MOVEMENT, STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT,
HUMAN RIGHTS, SOCIAL ISSUES, SECURITY ISSUES, ECONOMIC ISSUES, Norway, Dec.
11, 1998 (hereinafter OSLO II FINAL REPORT) (on file with the author and also with
various individuals including members of the Oslo Group, the Cyprus Fulbright
Commission, officials from both communities, and the press).
226 [Vol. 28:205
Cyprus Reunification
needs.70 Though they expressed strong feelings during the
negotiation process that lasted into the early hours of their last full
morning in Oslo, there was no acrimony, common courtesy
prevailed, and the participants gave recognition to each other
through a democratic process.171 They acted solely as private citizens
and did not claim to speak for others, officially or unofficially. They
desired only that others may consider and frankly discuss the issue
of peace in Cyprus and a lasting solution to the Cyprus Problem,
and that people in both communities would speak and listen to
each other, practicing empowerment and recognition. They
operated under the belief that the only opinions not heard are
those not expressed.72
These 31 dedicated people,'73 along with their remaining 21
colleagues, intended to continue their work on these and other
issues in the future, and they welcomed others to join and fully
participate with them in the effort to achieve peace on the island,
for the benefit and well being of all Cypriots. 7' They demonstrated
that the results were not as important as the process employed.
They could all work together and triumph over adversity, setting
an example of peaceful cooperation. In this spirit, the final vote on
each issue was set forth on the section divider that preceded the
particular presentation. 5
The Cyprus Fulbright Commission and the U.S.-Norway
Fulbright Foundation for Educational Exchange cooperated to
provide this opportunity for bicommunal self-expression.'7 It
appears that this may have been the first such collaboration
between Fulbright organizations from different countries. The
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PRIO supported
this cooperative effort financially and otherwise.'
In originally organizing the Oslo Group and training them in
various conflict intervention skills as well as facilitating their
deliberations during both meetings, and at the numerous
bicommunal steering committee gatherings, it became more
convincing at each stage that, if the people of this island could be
170. Id.
171. Id. ("Recognition" simply meant respecting differing opinions.)
172. Id.
173. There were fifteen Greek Cypriots and sixteen Turkish Cypriots.
174. See OSLO II FINAL REPORT, supra note 169.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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left alone to work together as Cypriots without interference, they
would find the solution to the problem and a lasting peace could
finally be achieved in Cyprus. The fact that the members of the
Oslo Group were willing to meet and work together as private
citizens to arrive at a solution to be recommended to others, and
that they actually did succeed in doing so, is far more important
than what they actually recommended. Nevertheless, it is
informative to see what they accomplished in the process,
especially when comparing their success at the level of Track III
diplomacy with the historical failures of the elite diplomats in
Track I.
The Oslo Report
The forty-six page'7 8 Final Report of the Oslo Group is a
collection of six papers, each addressing one of the following six
issues designated for immediate consideration and development:
Bicommunal Movement, Structure of Government, Human
Rights, Social Issues, Security Issues, and Economic Issues. '
1. Bicommunal Movement"0
The importance of the bicommunal movement is its link
between the two communities. It formed a bridge between the
current problem and the envisaged solution, through "co-
operation, collaboration, trust and understanding between the two
communities" and the exploration and examination of "common
grounds on certain issues .. .regarding the envisaged solution.' 8
Its mission was to "contribute towards the establishment of a
lasting peaceful Federal State" that would "safeguard the peaceful
coexistence" of each community "through strong security
measures in every aspect and to form one identity.'8 2
In order to be successful, the bicommunal movement would
need to be institutionalized, structured, and encourage new
participation through a "democratic institution whose operations
178. The actual number of pages containing the declaration of the group and the
substantive provisions of the six papers total thirty-five. OSLO II FINAL REPORT, supra
note 169.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 8. Adopted unanimously.
181. Id. at 9.
182. Id.
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will be safeguarded by democratic procedures."'83 Detailed
provisions were proposed regarding objectives, institutionalization,
methods, organizational structure, a bicommunal council and
selection procedure with equal community membership from each
bicommunal activity group, a steering committee and selection
procedure for five members from each community, responsibilities
for the council and steering committee, administration and
accounting procedures, reference materials, and a proposed action
plan.'
2. Structure of Government"
A bicommunal, bizonal "Federal Republic of Cyprus (FRC)"
would be established with "one international personality and one
citizenship," consisting of "two federated states" administered
respectively by each of the communities." Each of the states
would be administered "on the basis of political equality in the
federal structure" (legislature, executive and judiciary) with the
federal constitution recognizing "all human rights of all Cypriots
and shall provide for their implementation."'87 Each state was to
have its own constitution, legislative body, executive, and
judiciary, and decide all issues not reserved to the federal
government." The federal constitution was to be the "supreme law
of the FRC" and would prevail as between the states in the event
of conflict.'89 Some of the listed powers (e.g., police) could be
exercised concurrently with the federal government.
The powers of the federal legislature and executive were:
foreign affairs; defense; citizenship and immigration; federal
budget and federal taxation (fiscal and monetary policy and
central bank); customs; federal police; port; air traffic control and
civil aviation; external commerce; ensuring free and unfettered
183. Id.
184. Id. at 9-14.
185. Id. at 15. Approved: 29, disapproved: 2. Both disapprovals were from Greek
Cypriots. One objected to the provisions concerning sovereignty, political equality, the
term "state," single chamber federal legislature, election of the president and vice-
president. The other objected to the provision concerning a single chamber federal
legislature.
186. Id. at 16.
187. Id. at 16.
188. Id. at 16.
189. Id. at 16.
190. Id. at 17.
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interstate trade; health; environment; natural resources; federal
postal and communications services; registration of patents and
trademarks; registration of companies; and any other powers that
would be agreed upon by the two federated states. "'
The federal legislature was to be "single chamber" and consist
of an "equal number of representatives of each federated state.' 92
Only "a simple majority" would be required to enact legislation. '93
The "presidential system" was adopted for the federal
government, with a vice-president to be from a different
community than the president.' Selection of the president was left
open between election "by universal suffrage" and rotation
between the two communities after election.'9"
Flags, federal anthem, and public holidays were categories left
to be decided.'96 The proposed court system was elaborate; it
provided for a lower and higher court in each state, a federal court,
and the European Court of Human Rights. In some situations, a
citizen could apply directly to the federal court, which was to be
composed of an equal number of judges from each community.'9
Cyprus laws would be considered in all the courts, but only the
states would have jurisdiction over family law.'"
3. Human Rights2"
Human rights were to be "approached from the point of view
of the needs of every individual and must be based on
international norms and criteria.""' It was specifically noted that
these issues must be considered "in order to achieve serious
progress towards the final and lasting solution.""° The main issues
addressed are: missing persons, settlers, refugees and property,
freedom of movement, and identity. °3
191. Id. at 16.
192. Id. at 17.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 18.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Adopted unanimously, although one Greek Cypriot "expressed reservations as to
the provisions concerning missing persons and settlers." Id. at 19.
201. Id. at 20.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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A. Missing Persons
This issue was to be given priority, removed from the political
arena in order to avoid political exploitation, and put "into a
common humanitarian perspective."2" Both sides encouraged
continuation of the work of the "existing independent commission
on missing persons," and it was suggested that representatives of
the families of missing persons be involved in the efforts. 5 Specific
instances of atrocities were to be avoided, with emphasis placed on
"what happened, in general terms."2"6 The commission was charged
jointly with "truth and reconciliation so that things are brought to
light, and both communities accept responsibility and apologize to
the other community for the atrocities." 7 Political leaders were
urged "to accept political cost in order to relieve human
suffering."" Policies were encouraged that jointly honored and
remembered "the missing and victims of atrocities."2" In order to
avoid continuance of unrealistic hopes, the category of "missing,
presumed dead" was to be ascribed to those cases where families
were satisfied that individuals could not be traced.""
B. Settlers
The issue of what to do about citizenship for those non-
Cypriot individuals living in northern Cyprus was to be addressed
in a humanitarian manner." Cypriot citizenship was recommended
for settlers who had been married to Cypriots for over three
years.12 However, individuals "born in Cyprus, of non Cypriot
origin, and their first degree relatives" would be permitted to
remain on the island, but "given the option to accept a repatriation
scheme to be developed."" The new federal government would be
responsible for granting citizenship. 4
204. Id. at 20.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 21.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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C. Refugees and Property
It was recommended that refugees have the right of return to
their property and/or the right to be compensated for loss of
property."5 In order to facilitate a large return of Greek Cypriot
refugees, territorial adjustments "along the lines of the
percentages outlined in the Ghali Ideas" were recommended.216
Subject to the security needs of each community, all Cypriots
would be given the gradual right to return to their former homes
taking into consideration the present occupants of the property
and the time necessary to build bicommunal confidence and
relations.217 Property-owning refugees choosing not to return would
be compensated."8 The Ghali proposals on compensation were
adopted.219 Once all the territorial adjustments had been
completed, it was contemplated that the federal government would
establish regulations concerning purchase and ownership of
property so that all Cypriots would have the right to purchase
property anywhere on the island.22°
D. Freedom of Movement
Balanced against the security needs of each community,
complete freedom of movement (for individuals, goods, and
services) was the goal to be achieved "as quickly as possible.
22'
Foreign workers could be employed only if "local people" were
unavailable. Extremism from either side was to be discouraged
through joint policing, with violators being "identified, exposed
and severely punished."23
E. Identity
Notwithstanding the historical weakening of the Cypriot
identity, "a unique Cypriot identity" was claimed that should be
the basis for mutual acceptance and respect.22 ' The Cypriot
215. Id. at 21.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 21-22.
220. Id. at 22.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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multicultural society was referred to in the hope that "humanistic
values" rather than "national values" would be developed. 25 The
positive history of how the two communities had lived together
was to be preferred over the negative "two versions of history"
that prevailed.226 Creation of cultural endeavors was encouraged in
an effort to promote the unique Cypriot culture domestically and
internationally.22 This "very difficult and sensitive aspect of the
Cyprus problem" was to be dealt with through confidence-building
measures using "international norms and criteria. ' '22 8 Certain
provisions of the Economic Issues paper were adopted concerning
compensation for property. 9
4. Social Issues30
This paper dealt with education, language, environment,
health services, public relations, cultural heritage, and
reconstitution of the society.23'
A. Education
Education was referred to as something that could assist in
bicommunal tolerance and the ability of each community to live
peacefully with the other.32 The educational system of each
community was charged with having been "at the root of the
Cyprus problem" because for decades it poisoned "the relations of
the two communities," created "negative stereotypes," built
"hatred for the 'other' as the 'enemy'," and encouraged
"nationalism and chauvinism. 2 ' An entirely new bicommunal
approach was called for that would feature Cyprus (rather than
either Greece or Turkey) as the "mother country" respecting all
cultures and communities." '
B. Language
Language was singled out as being responsible for the barrier
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 23.
229. Id.
230. Approved: 28; abstained: 1; absent: 2. Id. at 25.
231. Id. at 26.
232. Id. at 27.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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between the two communities because of the two mother
tongues.2" As a result, English was designated as the language that
should be used to remove the barrier.236 Greek and Turkish would
become the compulsory second languages in the opposite
communities, respectively, taught from the third grade.237
C. Environment
Adoption of a bicommunal program "based on the 24
principles of the UN charter for the environment" was proposed,
"the aim of which shall be the sustainable development of the
country."
238
D. Health Services
Basing the recommendation on past use by Turkish Cypriots
of the apparently superior health care facilities of the Greek
Cypriots, a proposal was made for a more organized arrangement
that could assist in reuniting the two communities in a bid for
peace.29 This would include one general hospital and several
specialized clinics for the island as a whole. 0 Common agendas
were encouraged for the various health-related NGOs in the two
2411communities.
E. Public Relations
This area was singled out as a necessary prerequisite to a
successful peace process.42  Specific areas designated for
concentration of efforts by the bicommunal groups were: (1) the
need for rapprochement, (2) the purpose of bicommunal meetings
and the organizations participating in such gatherings, (3) the
promotion of each other's community within the opposite
community, (4) organization of conflict resolution institutions that
"will use the methodology to seek mutually accepted solutions to
conflicts," (5) creation of common-interest clubs, and (6) emphasis
on the major role of women in the peace process as the more
235. Id. at 28.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 28-29.
238. Id. at 29.
239. Id. at 30.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 31.
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successful of the genders in this endeavor. 3 In the list of various
methods to be employed in the public relations campaign for
peace, a provision for creation of a "remembrance and forgiveness
group" was inserted "to establish and acknowledge our past
mistakes and cultivate the belief in forgiveness to enable us to
move on. ,2"
F. Cultural Heritage
It was declared that "our common future on this island must
be based on the respect for the heritage of both communities.
2 4 5
Cultural heritage was to be a uniting rather than a divisive force,
and something to be promoted to the outside world. ' Collecting
stories from past generations of the island "who had lived together
in peace and harmony"2 "7 prior to the outbreak of hostilities
resulting in the current division was encouraged. Tolerance for
both cultures and heritages was suggested.2" Publicizing and
preserving historical sites was urged, as was the early education of
students to appreciate the diverse heritage of the island.49 A
dictionary of common words of each community used by the other
was also proposed.50
G. Reconstruction of the Society
It was noted that since 1955 "Cypriot society was an
essentially divided society" because of religion and language as
well as social disparities in the areas of business, police and civil
service.21' Religion was targeted as a "major obstacle" because of
the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus prohibition
against intermarriageY.2 2 Acknowledgement was made that the 1974
war was the cause of non-communication between the two
communities, "poisoned through the mass media on both sides."5 3
Noting that, regardless of the particular form of the final solution
243. Id.
244. Id. at 32.
245. Id. at 32.
246. Id. at 32.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 32.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 33.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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to the Cyprus problem, "a reconstitution of the society along with
some kind of integration" would be an indispensable condition to
preserve the distinct existence of Cyprus."4 In order to achieve this,
the elimination of negative references to Greek or Turkish
Cypriots was recommended in an effort to prevent the two
communities living apart and behaving as strangers on the small
island. In order to accomplish reconstruction of the society, the
following recommendations were made: (1) seek "proper behavior
of the mass media," (2) change in the system of education, (3)
establishment of permanent bicommunal youth camps, (4)
encourage efforts to change attitudes to appreciate how much both
communities share in common, (5) emphasize the Cypriot nature
of the two communities rather than looking to Greece or Turkey,
and (6) discover methods to create "common myths." 5
5. Security
The Security paper dealt with five areas: Guarantees,
Demilitarization, Extremists, Trust, and Territory. 6
A. Guarantees
A treaty of guarantee would secure the security of the new
Federal Republic and of the two sovereign states created. 7 Until
the Federal Republic should be admitted as a full EU member, the
guarantor countries of Greece, Turkey, and the UK, plus the UN
Security Council, would be looked to for security. 5 When full EU
membership is attained, the security arrangements of the EU are
to be added.5' The independence and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic and the two separate states would be
guaranteed, and any union with another country or any form of
partition or secession was prohibited..2 ' Neither state could
unilaterally amend the constitution of the Federal Republic, nor
could either subsequently withdraw from the treaty of guarantee
when it was decided that a system of guarantee was no longer
254. Id. at 34.
255. Id. at 34.
256. Id. at 36-40. Approved: 22; abstained: 8; absent: 1. One Turkish Cypriot "objected
to the provision concerning guarantees." Id. at 36.
257. Id. at 37.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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needed.2 ' A Supervision and Verification Committee was to be
formed for purposes of responding to security threats to the
Federal Republic or either single state.262 Members of the
committee would be representatives of the guarantor powers and
of the president and vice-president of the new Federal Republic."'
UN support personnel would assist the committee in carrying out
its responsibilities to investigate "any development, which in the
view of any of its member [sic] is a threat to the security of either
side or of the Federal Republic. '2 1 Investigation would be
conducted "through inspection or any other method deemed
necessary."6 5 Prompt implementation of recommendations of the
committee for rectification of treaty violations would be
required.2" Support to the committee would come from UN
Security Council revision of the UNFICYP mandate.267
B. Demilitarization
The Federal Republic and each of the separate states would
form separate police forces." All paramilitary activities and
possession of weapons (other than those for which hunting licenses
have been issued) would be outlawed by the Federal Republic. 9
Violation would be a federal offense. Importation or transit of
weapons, absent federal government approval, would be
prohibited.2 1' A specific time frame for complete demilitarization
would be agreed upon.Y Civilian groups would be prohibited from
engaging in reserve force, military, or paramilitary training. 3 Each
side would implement the agreement for demilitarization
simultaneously. 2 4 In the event that complete militarization was not
accomplished, both sides would have the right to return to the last
261. Id.
262. Id. at 37-38.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 38.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 38.
269. Id.
270. ld.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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stage fulfilled.275 Gradual disarmament on the "Green Line" was
contemplated through a process that provided for mixed patrols
consisting of police from both sides in conjunction with UN
personnel.276 This would be an "intermediate area" constantly
expanding, with free movement of people, merchandise, and
settlement, so that eventual workplaces would be created.
C. Extremists
Police forces on both sides were encouraged to control their
extremists pursuant to contemplated Federal Republic law."8 With
the publicity assistance of the mass media, a committee consisting
of educators from both sides would revise the textbooks containing
the history of Cyprus in an effort to prevent the growth of
extremist ideas."9 Existing foreign extremist elements would be
banished from Cyprus and those not yet present would be
prohibited from enteringY
D. Trust
Trust is something that should be promoted by the Federal
Republic on an international basis, and schoolbooks should refer
to each community in a proper manner."' Companies in one
community should be encouraged to hire members of the other
community. 2 The mass media should be encouraged to participate
in the process of confidence-building, and there should be a day
recognizing the victims of bicommunal violence. 3
E. Territory
The Federal Republic consisting of the two federated states
would have an "indivisible personality."' While not affecting the
demographic character of the respective federated states, Cypriots
would have the freedom to live in either zone of the bizonal,
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 39.
278. Id. at 39-40.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 40.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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bicommunal Federal Republic. 5 The federal government would
have the responsibility for territorial arrangements resulting from
the freedom of settlement, travel and possession guaranteed by the
federal constitution.2' Because of past historical failures to solve
the Cyprus problem, it was recommended that international
organizations in addition to Turkey and Greece should be part of
the guarantor process.28" Success would depend on both sides
trusting each other to work together and believing in what they
have agreed to do.2
6. Economic Issues289
The economic matters dealt with in this part of the report
were: compensation, European Union (EU), embargos, and
currency.90 The term "embargo" was used only in the context of
the non-recognition problems suffered by the Turkish Cypriots as
a result of the events that have occurred since the 1974 war.2 9' The
issue of compensation was relevant only in connection with those
who would seek redress. In that event, the Gali [Ghali] Set of
Ideas was to be the basis for discussion. The Federal Republic of
Cyprus should be the entity that would become a full member of
the EU, with the Turkish Cypriot community having full
representation and participating equally in accession
negotiations .29  Because it would be in the interest of the Federal
Republic, the accession of Turkey to the EU was supported.294 So
long as there would be no prejudice to either side, interim
measures that promote confidence and good will were supported.2 5
A single federal currency issued through a single central bank,
autonomous of the EU and the euro, was encouraged.96
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Approved: 29; Disapproved: 2. One Turkish Cypriot "objected to the provisions
concerning the European Union, and territorial adjustment and compensation." A second
Turkish Cypriot "objected to the provisions concerning accession negotiation and
accession to the European Union." Id. at 41.
290. Id. at 42-43.
291. Id. at42.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 43.
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Compensation would be provided for loss of bank deposits, and
Turkish Cypriot banks were to be compensated for their statutory
reserves deposited with the Central Bank of Cyprus prior to
1974.297
A. Compensation
The property claims of displaced persons from both
communities were recognized and should "be dealt with fairly on
the basis of a time-frame and practical regulations based on the
1977 high-level agreement on the need to ensure social peace and
harmony," and on the provisions of the paper.298 The question of
compensation would be considered only in those cases where
individuals freely chose that option.2" As a first priority, the Greek
Cypriot administration would have the responsibility for relocation
and support concerning Turkish Cypriots residing in the area
under Greek Cypriot control as well as displaced persons who
would be returning.' Turkish Cypriot 1974 residents would be
able to elect to remain in the area under Greek Cypriot
administration or request comparable property in the area coming
under Turkish Cypriot administration. ' Displaced Turkish
Cypriots residing under Greek Cypriot administration would have
the option of receiving a comparable residence in that area,
returning to their former property, or receiving a comparable
residence in the area under Turkish Cypriot administration.3"'
Establishment of a bicommunal committee to "arrange for suitable
housing for all persons affected by the territorial adjustments"
would take place immediately after referenda approval."'
297. Id.
298. Id. at 43. See generally PALLEY, supra note 52, at 344. On February 12, 1977,
Makarios and Denktash, in the presence of UN Secretary-General Dr. Kurt Waldheim, at
UNFICYP Headquarters, Nicosia, Cyprus, agreed to seek "an independent, non-aligned,
bi-communal Federal Republic" with "territory under the administration of each
community [to be] discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land-
ownership." Issues such as "freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of
property and other specific matters [remained] open for discussion taking into
consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical
difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community." With respect to the
"powers and functions of the central federal government," they were "to safeguard the
unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the State." Id.
299. Id. at 43.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 43-44.
303. See OSLO II FINAL REPORT, supra note 169, at 44.
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In the areas under either Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot
administration, each community would be responsible for
establishing an agency to handle issues related to displaced
persons."° Where displaced persons elect to seek compensation for
lost property, ownership of that property would be transferred to
the community having administration of that area."' Title to such
properties would be exchanged "between the two [community]
agencies at the 1974 values plus inflation. 3 1 6 Compensation to
displaced persons would be made by the agency in their
community from sales or exchange of transferred property
effected by the agency. 7 The owners of property would have the
election to be compensated at either 1974 figures plus inflation or
at current prices. 8 In the event of a shortfall of funds necessary for
property compensation, the federal government would provide the
deficit from a compensation fund of revenue sources "such as
windfall taxes on the increased value of transferred properties
following the overall agreement, and savings from defense
spending."3 9 Added revenue to cover the shortfall would come
from the solicitation of contributions to the compensation fund
from other governments and international organizations.1 Long-
term leasing and other commercial arrangements could also be
considered as a source of shortfall funding."' Authorized claimants
for compensation were to be: (1) Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots (or their heirs) who resided and/or owned property in
1974 that would now be located in the area administered by the
other community, and (2) post-December 1963 displaced persons
(or their heirs) from either community. 12
The option to return could also be elected by those current
permanent residents of Cyprus in the federated state now
administered by the other community who were owners of that
property at the time of their displacement.313 If current permanent
residents had been renters at the time of displacement, and they
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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wished to resume permanent residency in the area, they would
receive priority under arrangements for freedom of settlement.3 4
Filing periods for claims, a limitation on the number of annual
applications, and a deadline year for return to permanent
residence were discussed."' Provisions were also made for a joint
federated state review for evaluation of the situation at the end of
a prescribed period.16 That period would begin upon essential
completion of the resettlement and rehabilitation process resulting
from territorial adjustment. Settlement of those electing to return
would not occur until satisfactory relocation of those affected by
such election.17 Notwithstanding the need to preserve original
ownership rights, special provisions were designed to cover the
following situations: (1) where current occupant displaced persons
express a wish to remain, (2) where substantial alterations or
improvements to the property have been made by the current
occupant, (3) where the property has been converted to public use,
or (4) where persons who have been involved in hate crimes
against persons in the community of return have, after due process
of law, been prevented from returning by that federated state.31
B. European Union
It was made clear that EU membership for the new Federal
Republic "should not be dependent on the membership of any
other country." '' While the EU could make a significant
contribution, irrespective of accession to membership the priority
for the new Federal Republic should be equalization between the
communities of their economic standards.12' As the EU
membership accession process continues, the Turkish Cypriot
community should be permitted to participate in the negotiations
without prejudice to its position in relation to settlement of the
314. Id.
315. Id. at 45. Apparently, no limitation was placed on the right of return for those
Maronites who in 1974 lost their permanent residence in the area of the federated state
that would be under the future administration of the Turkish Cypriot community.
Maronites are "a Christian sect that had emigrated to Cyprus, predominantly from
Lebanon" during the Ottoman period (1571-1878). See INSIGHT GUIDES: CYPRUS 65
(Hansjorg Brey & Claudia Muller eds., 1993) (explaining that Maronites historically had
been living in enclaves in northern Cyprus).
316. OSLO 11 FINAL REPORT, supra note 169, at 45.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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Cyprus problem.32'
C. Embargos
Without prejudicing the position of either community in
relation to the settlement of the Cyprus problem, interim measures
should be created to: (1) establish "free business or shopping
areas" for both communities in places such as Pyla Village, (2)
facilitate the free movement of tourists between the two
communities, (3) lift all local and international restrictions
concerning communication and transportation (e.g., postal and
telephone), (4) permit freedom of travel for Turkish Cypriots on
the same basis as Greek Cypriots, (5) allow channeling of
international financial aid and support to both communities, and
(6) make possible the participation of Turkish Cypriots in
international cultural and sporting events.22
D. Fiscal Issues
The federal and state constitutions should provide for the levy
of taxes on all levels of the federal system (central government,
each federated state, and local authorities).'
E. Public Reaction
Subsequent to its completion, the members of the Oslo Group
attempted to get a hearing for their report from government
officials, press, and others on both sides, who they thought would
be interested in the results. They were mostly ignored for three
years.12' Then, in the early part of 2002, a Greek Cypriot Sunday
front-page newspaper story referred to what the Oslo Group did
as "shocking.' 2' Also, participants in the group are criticized as
being "hand picked by the Americans" and "betraying the pain"
caused by Turkey's invasion of the island, and their work was
described as a "pointless psychological effort" to deal with a
"geopolitical problem.', 2 6
321. Id.
322. Id. at 46.
323. Id.
324. See Jennie Matthew, Conflict Resolution Critics 'Playing a Political Game,'
CYPRUS MAIL: NEWS ARTICLES IN ENGLISH, Jan. 29, 2002,
http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cmnews/2002/02-01-29.cmnews.html.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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The work of the group is also seen as the result of "American
input" that seeks to "promote unacceptable compromises"
through the "US Embassy in Nicosia and the American Fulbright
Commission" as the "major sponsors of conflict resolution groups"
with annual $15 million in U.S. Congressional appropriations to
"help solve the Cyprus problem...... All of which may have been
caused by the "face-to-face negotiations between President
Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and
the 2003 Presidential Elections" in the Greek Cypriot
328community.
The Turkish Cypriot press also expressed itself around the
same time. Under a "banner headline" the newspaper Yeni Duzen
announced that e-mail threats were made against the lives of
Turkish Cypriot Oslo Group members and their families as a
result of the Oslo Report. 29
Following this, on February 14, 2002, five original Greek
Cypriot members of the Oslo Group held a press conference in
Nicosia where they defended the activities of the group and its
report against critics who had labeled it as "treacherous." '
Although it was acknowledged that this had been "the first time
that 25 people from both sides came together and agreed on the
contents of a document," the press within the last week before the
conference had "dredged up the report branding much of its
content unacceptable." '31 The five Greek Cypriots "accused the
media of being hypocritical and of having totally ignored the
report" because only two newspapers "published anything" three
years earlier.332 They also noted that both Clerides and Denktash
had "refused to look at it" even though they had been "offered
copies from their respective sides.333 The group suspected that the
''resurrection" of the report was "linked to someone's political
agenda in view of the resumption of direct talks, which began on
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See Threatening E-mails to the Turkish Cypriot Members of the Oslo Group,
CYPRUS PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE: TURKISH CYPRIOT PRESS REVIEW
DIRECTORY, Feb. 11, 2002, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2002/02-02-11.tcpr.html.
330. See Jean Christou, Oslo Group Slams its Critics, CYPRUS MAIL: NEWS ARTICLES
IN ENGLISH, Feb. 15, 2002, available at http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cmnews/2002/02-
02-15.cmnews.html.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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January 16," 2002." '
The five Greek Cypriots also made it clear that they had
acted in their personal capacities and had not claimed that their
work "would result in a political solution. 335 They praised the
Turkish Cypriot members of the Oslo Group "who were brave
enough to defend and support within their community the
methodology used by the group and its final outcome, as well as
the right of every Cypriot to meet and express themselves freely
despite the pressure and threats they faced.
3
1
6
F. Post-Oslo Workshops
During the summer of 2000, pursuant to an arrangement
funded by the United Nations Office of Project Services
(UNOPS), I returned to Cyprus to provide an advanced program
to a selected number of those who had been trained by me earlier.
I planned to expand on the humanistic aspects of the Umbreit
model. However, just prior to my departure for Cyprus, a new
model of conflict resolution was published. This is referred to as
"narrative mediation" and was designed to succeed where the
more traditional problem-solving and interest-based models failed,
especially in the area of violence and international hostilities."7 I
decided to use this new model as the basis for the advanced
bicommunal training.
My interest in teaching this radical new model was motivated
by the fact that it developed the individual stories of the parties to
a conflict as a means of creating a lasting resolution. Its goal is to
create a relationship incompatible with conflict, which is
accomplished through a transformed relationship constructed from
stories that demonstrate understanding, respect, and collaboration.
The complex nature of conflicts is deconstructed and replaced by
new possibilities for change through (1) achieving a trusting
relationship with the parties, (2) mapping the effects of a particular
conflict's history, (3) constructing a new narrative for solution, and
(4) seeking consensus and resolution.
My prior work (1997-1999) with the general population was
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See generally JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A
NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2000).
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centered on teaching the bicommunal participants how to connect
and communicate, getting them to role-play scenarios from their
respective cultures, and demonstrating how the various mediation
models could successfully resolve conflict in the situations that
they developed. While they were able to work and negotiate
successfully with each other in a bicommunal setting, they always
did so without allowing those from the other side to really
experience their very personal deep-seeded feelings related by
historical divisive images.
When I explained the narrative model in September of 2000,
the participants in the bicommunal workshop were at best resistant
and proceeded reluctantly. However, in the process of telling their
stories they became empowered to express themselves without
reservation, managed to give each other's point of view
recognition, and genuinely attempted to understand how the other
side felt historically.
The conclusion of the lengthy workshop disclosed unanimity
of feeling that, contrary to their original reluctance, participants
accomplished something special for the first time in the twenty-six
years of the island's divisive history. They were able to speak
openly about their respective traumas and understand the diverse
points of view generated by the historical passage from one
generation to another. It was clearly possible that unresolved
resentments previously festering in this civil society could now be
controlled.
I returned to Cyprus in June 2003 to once again work with
selected participants from my prior programs.338 The purpose of the
two 2003 bicommunal workshops339 was to provide an opportunity
for the participants to become familiar with and discuss in detail
338. Pursuant to a Sally Casanova Memorial Grant from California State University,
Dominguez Hills.
339. Two consecutive one-week bicommunal workshops had been scheduled with
duplicate agendas in order to keep the size of each manageable and to accommodate the
schedules of the various participants. However, most of the people designated for the first
workshop preferred the second, resulting in a much smaller first workshop and a much
larger second one. It is the second workshop that produced the activity referred to in this
article. While the first workshop (seven days) was effective, the extent of the debate was
limited due to its small size (seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots, which
varied from day-to-day). Some of the participants from the first workshop decided to also
attend the second one because they wanted to interact with the larger group. The second
workshop, which lasted six days, was attended by fifteen Greek Cypriots and sixteen
Turkish Cypriots, which also varied from day-to-day.
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the proposed Annan Plan for reunification of Cyprus.34  The
ground rules were set forth at the beginning of each workshop.4
The participants in the larger second workshop decided that they
did not want to debate the Annan Plan per se, but rather desired
to brainstorm their own list of peace plan issues for their agenda.342
Honoring their wish, that approach was taken. The participants
created a possible list of 48 issues for group consideration. 3 From
340. Annan Plan for Cyprus Settlement, http://www.tcea.org.uk/Annan-Plan-For-
Cyprus-Settlement.htm. Main points of the Annan Plan:
1. A single state comprised of two equal components in a dissoluble union
2. A single international entity offering a single Cypriot citizenship
3. Territorial adjustments reducing Turkish Cypriot component of the island to
28.5% from 36%
4. Return of 85,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes in the island's Turkish
Cypriot north
5. Cyprus to join the European Union and maintain special links to Greece and
Turkey
6. A two-chamber parliament, each containing 48 members
7. A six-member presidential council proportional to the population of the two
states, with a 10-month rotating presidency
8. Demilitarization of the island, reinforced by an embargo on arms imports
9. Constitutional safeguards for civil and minority rights
341. "JUNE PEACEBUILDING WORKSHOP NUMBER TWO
RULES GOVERNING DISCUSSION OF THE ANNAN PLAN"
1. Please practice empowerment and recognition
2. Please be courteous, wait for the prior speaker to fully conclude, do not interrupt
3. Please speak only when you have something NEW to add.. .DO NOT REPEAT
what others have said. before you.. .AND REMEMBER: 'I' STATEMENTS
4. Please be patient and wait for your turn to speak. You will be recognized
eventually for that purpose, and you will have the opportunity to express
yourself
5. Please express YOUR PERSONAL VISION regarding the possible content of
the Plan
6. Please consider the respective interests and underlying needs involved rather than
positions.. .AND REMEMBER: ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANISTIC
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
7. Please be persuasive and not coercive
8. Please be collaborative rather than confrontational
9. Please make it all work
10. Please keep in mind that each of you CAN make a difference
"GOAL: To create a possible grassroots alternate plan by consensus that you feel could
work to solve the Cyprus problem."
342. The Turkish Cypriots appeared to have more knowledge of the actual Plan
provisions than did the Greek Cypriots.
343. "JUNE 2003 PEACEBUILDING WORKSHOP NUMBER TWO***
LIST OF POSSIBLE PEACE PLAN ISSUES FOR AGENDA"
1. All people on Cyprus living together in peace
2. Long-term vision of future for Cyprus
3. Provision for periodic revisions of plan
4. Return of displaced persons from each community
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this list ten main issues with their respective sub-issues were
5. Immediate removal of all barriers, embargoes, and complete freedom of
movement for all people on Cyprus without showing passports
6. Equal rights (human and otherwise) and opportunities for all people on Cyprus
7. Balancing property rights with the right of shelter
8. Demilitarization
9. Definition of 'just and lasting solution to Cyprus problem'
10. Procedure to guarantee endurance of a dissoluble union
11. Exercise of political rights for citizens at both state and federal levels
12. A single state comprised of two equal units
13. Freedom of settlement without limitation
14. Proportionate representation should reflect the population of the two
communities
15. Structure and term of presidency
16. Turkish Cypriot state to continue with current name with current geographical
boundaries
17. Respect for international agreements
18. Territorial adjustments
19. European Union membership and special links to Greece and Turkey
20. Definition of terms to be used
21. Adoption of law of the European Union as the basis for the laws of Cyprus
22. Common education facilities [modified during discussion to include 'one version
of revised history; bi-communal respect for tolerance, diversity, and ethnicity']
23. Common health facilities
24. Control of airspace
25. Ways of removing [modified during discussion to include 'animosity, hostility,
and'] ill feelings between the two communities
26. Unified state without discrimination
27. Elections and voting structure
28. Trade rights and agreements
29. Legitimacy of European Union accession
30. How to learn not to 'bury future in the past'
31. Eurovision selection process for Cyprus
32. Mainland Turks
33. Civil and criminal court structure with two-state jurisdiction
34. Effect of no solution to Cyprus problem by May 2004
35. No links to Turkey or Greece and no guarantors or British Bases
36. Establishment of an Office for Mediation
37. Cyprus and Turkey to become European Union members at the same time
38. Bicommunaltiy and bizonality
39. Citizenship and identity
40. Rights of other minorities on Cyprus
41. Areas of responsibility between federal and state entities and their functionality
42. Two separate states
43. Rights of subsequent purchasers
44. Global exchange and compensation
45. Revisiting 1960 Zurich Agreement
46. Interdependent economic system
47. Free labor movement and freedom to choose employment
48. Bicommunal youth centers
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selected for discussion and voting. '" Because of the length and
intensity of the subsequent discussion process, only five of the ten
issues selected (with their various sub-issues) were discussed and
voted on.345
When I subsequently presented the 2003 positive outcome
during an international workshop at Oxford University the
following October,3 6 I was astounded to discover that several of
the other participants felt that diplomacy is best left to the elites.
The fact that Alvaro de Soto, the U.N. Secretary-General's
representative and the de facto author of the Annan Plan,"' was
also in attendance made the lack of faith in civil society all the
more surprising.
The 2003 workshops questioned whether each community
could put aside its history in order to achieve the goodwill
necessary for a positive outcome in meeting the May 1, 2004
deadline established by the European Union for accession to
membership of a reunited Cyprus.348A negative answer would
admit only the Greek Cypriots to the European Union. In such
event, the division between the two communities would be further
exacerbated, and it could be only a matter of time before Turkey
would seek to partition and annex the northern part of Cyprus
because of its determination to maintain control over the entire
island as essential to her security.3 '  This appears to be
notwithstanding any necessity to protect Turkish Cypriots.5
Unfortunately, the division appears to have been further
breached by the failure of the referenda process on April 24,
344. In the order to be discussed, the following numbered issues from the list of 48
were selected: 6, 8, 25, 5, 22, 13, 32, 34, 1, and 21.
345. The five of the ten issues discussed and voted on were numbers 6, 8, 25, 5, 22.
While the purpose of this article does not extend to an analysis of the results of the voting,
it should be noted that the overwhelming majority of votes were in favor of positive
solutions.
346. See Othon Anastasakis et al., Getting to Yes: Suggestions for Embellishment of
the Annan Plan for Cyprus (2004), available at http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/esc-
lectures/OxfordCyprus.pdf.
347. See PALLEY, supra note 52, at 18-19.
348. Based on my information from the executive director of the Cyprus Fulbright
Commission, my 2003 workshops were the first to provide any kind of bicommunal
dialogue concerning the details of the Annan Plan. Incredibly, in view of the critical nature
of the Plan as the last hope for peace on Cyprus for the foreseeable future, numerous
bicommunal members with whom I interacted confirmed that my workshops were the
first. Id. at 236.
349. Id. at 236.
350. Id.
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2004,351 and the official admittance of only the Republic of Cyprus
(Greek Cypriots) to the European Union on May 1, 2004.352
V. How THE TRACK III APPROACH CAN BE APPLIED To
SITUATIONS WITH ANALOGOUS CONFLICT
Braithwaite argues that to be effective today, "diplomacy
must adopt practices and values more akin to those of restorative
justice," and that unless people can come to terms with their anger
and hatred of past crimes of war, peace has little chance to
succeed.3 53 He asserts the need for rituals to heal damaged souls, to
discover the ability to transform hatred into sorrow or forgiveness,
and exorcise the evil of the past while moving forward with hope.
Following Braithwaite's arguments, forgiveness is something that
requires that the survivors be emotionally ready; it cannot be
forced.
In advocating a reconfiguration, Braithwaite asserts that
"bottom up restorative justice" can heal ethnic division in those
instances where "restorative peacemaking" can be connected to
"top-down preventive diplomacy and negotiated cessation of
hostilities. 355 This can be the antidote to the official "elite
diplomacy," where deals are made among representatives of
governments without considering reactions of the general
population. 6 Elite diplomacy has failed to sustain the successes of
international mediation and preventive diplomacy. 7  It is
Braithwaite's contention "that to be effective, diplomacy must
adopt practices and values more akin to those of restorative
justice," which he refers to as "democratized restorative justice. '
The practices and values that I used for my work in Cyprus
can be described as part of a "democratized restorative justice"
approach. They are designed to transform the conflicted
relationships, to manage and ultimately resolve the controversy,
351. Id. at 217. Percentage of valid votes cast: Turkish Cypriots 64.91 "Yes;" Greek
Cypriots 75.83 "No."
352. See HANNAY, supra note 1, at 241.
353. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION
172, 207 (2002).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 169.
356. Id. at 170.
357. Id. at 170.
358. Id. at 172.
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while addressing the disputed issues. Members of civil society...
need to learn the skills and techniques of how to connect with each
other in order to effectively communicate as part of a "two-way
street." These are the tools that will make the process work.
Participants need to become empowered to tell each other
their stories, i.e. their personal points of view, in a respectful
listening atmosphere. This creates an understanding of the
storyteller's point of view and establishes his / her humanity. In
order to accomplish this, the participants must first acknowledge
that the "other side" is not the enemy, but rather the problem is
the enemy causing the conflict.
Next, it is important to work with the participants on the
reversal of their roles and their ability to "step into each other's
shoes" to fully appreciate their respective interests and underlying
needs. This view assists in establishing a different perspective. It
effectively says that there is no single "truth," but only the
perception of the facts as seen through the eyes of the beholder.
The result is the realization that there can be a respect for
different points of view without agreeing with the "other side."
This leads to a possible collaboration between opposing
points of view to create a mutually acceptable version of the events
from which the parties can move forward. In order to set the stage
for the process of forgiveness and reconciliation, the participants
need to practice tolerance, appreciate diversity and ethnicity, and
understand that each feels hurt while accepting that each has
caused pain. The participants also need to understand the damage
caused by anger and hatred, and the benefits of love and kindness.
Self-respect is the thread that binds all of this together, creating
what I refer to as the "Seven Keys to Peacebuilding. " These are:
* Empowerment to participate fully in the process
* Recognition of each other's point of view
* Trust established in order to "open the curtain" that
hides the past
* Truth disclosed without reservation in order to create
understanding
* Forgiveness given willingly while not being required to
forget
359. See HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, A PUBLIC PEACE PROCESS: SUSTAINED DIALOGUE
TO TRANSFORM RACIAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS 12 (1999). It is "the public area in
which citizens outside government do their work." This is "the arena in which the
associations citizens form and many less formal nongovernmental organizations work."
20061
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L Rev.
* Collaboration practiced to design productive solutions
* Reconciliation achieved for future peaceful conduct
VI. CONCLUSION
The bicommunal participants in my September 2000 narrative
mediation workshops were ordinary citizens who had the
opportunity to disclose their sorrows and suffering directly to each
other, followed by the expressions of apology and the granting of
forgiveness. They effectively accomplished the goal of
"humanizing" each other so that they understood and
acknowledged their respective points of view. If citizens in areas of
cultural, religious, ethnic, or political conflict are able to engage
the larger community on each side with the healing aspects of
mutual goal development and successful establishment of working
relationships, members of civil society may yet provide a positive
example of democratized restorative justice.
The lesson for peacebuilding seems clear. Rather than
continuing to rely on the elite approach to diplomacy at the Track
I level (or even Track II), those negotiating such conflicts should
consider all stakeholders and work from the ground up through
civil society, rather than from the top down entangled in the
special interests of those occupying the seats of government. The
approach suggested here provides individuals at the grass roots
with the opportunity to tell their stories about a particular
injustice, its consequences, and what must be done to "make things
right." The result can be more than simply a society with a greater
voice from its citizens. It also offers a more efficient and just
system of government as well as a truly positive step towards
securing an improved peaceful world.
Based on my personal experiences with Cypriots from all
levels of civil society at the grass roots on both sides of the "Green
Line" or Buffer Zone,3" I believe there is a viable argument for the
emphasis on Track III diplomacy (rather than the proliferation of
unsuccessful efforts to date at the level of Track I or even Track
II) as the next step in the attempt to achieve a positive peaceful
reunification of the island. History demonstrates that elite
diplomacy has failed. The results from the Oslo Group indicate
that Track III diplomacy from the bottom up could have possibly
made a difference in achieving a positive outcome in the
360. See HANNAY, supra note 1, at 6.
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bicommunal referenda voting on April 24, 2004.'1
Notwithstanding the emphatic reiteration of current Greek
Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopoulos, as to "the commitment
of my people, as well as my strong personal one, to the solution of
a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation,' 2 the peace process has not
been resumed. The result is that "time is cementing the status quo
- and thus working against the Cypriots - all Cypriots. 3 63 The EU
is considering "comprehensive proposals to put an end to the
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community,"" and it has urged
both sides "to show a willingness to compromise . . . and do the
impossible - reach for the other's hand ... to create a new united
Cyprus."36' Although working with Turkish Cypriot authorities to
enhance the economy, the EU has denied that the effect would be
recognition of the Turkish Cypriots as a separate state.
While all Cypriots have been able to "mix together fully and
cross to the opposite sides of the island," since April 2003, the fact
of the matter is that Greek and Turkish Cypriots for the most part
do not trust each other and engage in minimal contact.3 6 7 The
361. An impartial comparison of the written results of the Oslo Group with Annan I
through V clearly supports the conclusion that, if left to work it out themselves, the people
at the bottom are far superior to those at the top.
362. See PALLEY, supra note 52, at 241.
363. See Olli Rehn, Member, European Commission, Responsible for Enlargement,
Speech at the Cyprus International Conference Center (May 13, 1995), in CYPRUS: ONE
YEAR AFTER ACCESSION, at 3, available at http://europa.eu.int/comml
commissionbarroso/rehn/speeches/pdf/050513_nicosia.pdf.
364. Id. at 4.
365. Id. at 5.
366. See EU Pledges AID for Turkish Cyprus, BBC NEWS, available at
http://newsnote.bbc.co.wk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/3660
(last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
367. See Tabitha Morgan, Cyprus Keeps its Hidden Barrier, BBC NEWS (United
Kingdom), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4313016.stm (last visited
Oct. 7, 2005).
Emine Erk, Turkish Cypriot lawyer, whose husband is the mayor of North Nicosia,
represents some of the families of those who were killed during the 1974 war and who are
still missing. Believing that both sides should stop the political exploitation, she says: "If a
Greek Cypriot dares to mention any of the suffering of Turkish Cypriots he will be
accused of talking like a Turkish Cypriot extremist. And the same goes for Turkish
Cypriots.. .The Turkish Cypriot missing is an issue and a wound in the north for those
people... [T]he Greek Cypriot missing is an issue, and a wound in the south.. .There is no
sign of both groups getting together and realising [sic] that their grief is the same, the
crime against them is the same. That's the culture that unfortunately still needs a lot of
change." Greek Cypriot bicommunal activist Katie Economidou says: "There are no
results of all those 20 years of citizens being involved, like a bicommunal school,
bicommunal exchanges of trade, maybe companies founded together.. .There are no pages
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international community has indicated that it does not want the
status quo. The prospect of relief for the Turkish Cypriots from
the heavy burdens imposed by the embargo and lack of
international recognition (other than by Turkey) seems to indicate
a movement towards partition. The question for Turkey is why
only partition? Why would it not annex the entire northern part of
the island currently under joint Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
control? In the face of this, it is "perplexing to see that the Greek
Cypriot side does not wish to give in writing to the Secretary-
[G]eneral of the UN the changes it wants to have in [the] plan."'
Both communities need to discover how to engage in dialogue
together because a solution is in the best interest of each, and that
is where the open issues should be addressed.6 Turkey has
suggested a May or June 2006 meeting "under the auspices of UN
Secretary[-]General Kofi Annan" on the Cyprus conflict between
representatives from the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities
also to be attended by diplomats from Turkey and Greece.7 UN
reaction has been to indicate that its resumption of peace efforts
will have to wait until "after the May 2006 parliamentary elections
in the Republic of Cyprus [in order to] avoid a hasty new process
of negotiations, which would fail in no time......
Turkey has indicated a willingness to open its sea and airports
to Greek Cypriots in exchange for a reciprocal end to restrictions
on Turkish Cypriots. 2 The EU, US, and UN support of this effort
on [sic] our newspaper on the life of the other side. The Green Line is open physically for
us to move but there is an invisible barrier that stops us." Both women were members of
the Oslo Group and participants in my training workshops.
368. See Dr Ozdemir A. Ozgur, Comment - The Cyprus Problem: Ideas, Realities and
Might 2, available at http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.php?id=18989&catjid=1 (last
visited Sep. 1, 2005). "It must be pointed out that because of the Turkish Cypriots and
proximity of Cyprus to Turkey, as well as because of strategic, historical, moral and
psychological reasons, Turkey is not ready to forget and throw Cyprus out of her sight.
The more so, because she is surrounded by Greece on her western frontiers and would not
like to be surrounded by Greece in the south, too, through Cyprus, by hook or by crook.
Frankly speaking, Turkey's feelings are to some extent shared by the big powers. Here
comes again into the picture the role of might and mighty powers. The question is: can the
Greek idea confront and beat the might of Turkey and others? We have to use our
brains."
369. See Rehn, supra note 363, at 4.
370. See UN to Revive Cyprus Talks in May, EurActiv.com - EU News, Policy
Positions & EU Actors online, available at http://www.euractiv.com/
Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-152089-16&type=News (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
371. Id.
372. Id.
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has not been sufficient to prevent rejection by Greek Cypriot
President Tassos Papadopoulos and other leaders who have
claimed that Turkey's proposal was simply "a rehashing of earlier
inconclusive proposals. 3 . Former Greek Cypriot foreign minister
(1978-1983) Nicos Rolandis, who also held other government
positions, has noted that, had the Annan Plan been accepted,
"[n]inety thousand Greek Cypriots would have been able to go
back to their homes under Greek Cypriot administration" and
"[t]housands could have gone back under Turkish Cypriot
administration.""37 In addition, he has emphasized that "the
massive [Turkish Cypriot] construction bonanza on Greek Cypriot
properties in the [Turkish Cypriot] occupied area would never
have taken place. 3 5 The point of no return has passed for Greek
Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots have been able to convince
Greek Cypriot courts to issue orders for return of property to its
Turkish Cypriot owners.376
A handwritten quotation attributed to Margaret Mead,
passed to me by a participant during, the second June 2003
workshop discussion of the Annan Plan, seems particularly
apropos here: "Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful,
committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only
thing that ever has."3"
Perhaps it is time for a second Track III Oslo Group.
373. Id.
374. See Nicos A. Rolandis, King Jigme and Floundering Cyprus, available at
http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.php?id=24591&catid=l (last visited Feb. 26,
2006).
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. The participant was one of the teachers who had participated in the training for
educators as part of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission's bicommunal conflict resolution
program (an intensive 40-hour workshop in teaching tolerance in the classroom through
the use of people skills that improve human performance and communication) that I
conducted at the Neve Shalom peace village in Israel from August 25-30, 2000. The
quotation had been located on the inside front cover of the program materials that I
prepared and distributed to the participants at that workshop.
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